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“LIQUIDATED DAMAGES” IN GUEST
WORKER CONTRACTS:
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, DEBT
PEONAGE OR VALID CONTRACT CLAUSE?
Maria L. Ontiveros*
Non-citizen migrant workers who come to the United States on short term
work visas, especially H-1B visas, often sign contracts that include a promise to
work for the employer for a set period of time. These contracts may include a
“liquidated damages clause” that requires the worker to pay the employer a
large sum of money if they stop working for the employer, either to switch employers or to return home. Because these sums of money are so large relative to
the worker’s ability to pay, they prevent workers from leaving employment. This
paper examines whether those liquidated damages clauses are enforceable. It
suggests that there are two different ways to analyze these clauses: a contract law
approach and a free labor approach. The contract law approach, found in state
contract law and the statute that regulates H-1B visas, serves the dual purposes
of efficiency and compensation. The free labor approach, found in a variety of
statutes passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, on the other hand serves the purposes of protecting individuals and society from the ills associated with modern day slavery. This article examines two
different prohibitions contained in the free labor approach—prohibitions against
involuntary servitude and debt peonage. It explores and explains the differences
between these variations on unfree labor, with a focus on the purpose of prohibiting each arrangement. The article then returns to the problem of liquidated damages clauses in guest worker contracts to examine the implications of these competing approaches (contract law vs. free labor) for advocates, courts and
Congress.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Rituraj Singh Panwar, a migrant from India, completed his education in the United States after receiving masters degrees in kinesiology and
hospital management.1 In order to stay and work in the United States, he signed
an agreement to work as an H-1B “guest worker” with RN Staff/Access Technologies.2 Under the visa statute, Access Technologies had applied for and received the right to hire an H-1B worker, and it controlled who could fill that
1

These facts are drawn from Panwar v. Access Therapies, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952
(S.D. Ind. 2013) (Panwar I) and Panwar v. Access Therapies, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-00619TWP-TAB, 2015 WL 1396599, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2015) (Panwar II).
2 Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. at 953–54.
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visa.3 If Panwar left this employment, he would need to leave the country and
Access Technologies could fill the opening with another guest worker. The parties signed a two-year employment agreement stating that Panwar would receive between $800 and $1000 a week to work as a physical therapist.4 As part
of the agreement, Access Technologies demanded that Panwar sign a $20,000
promissory note payable as “liquidated damages” if he left before the end of the
contract term.5 Panwar soon realized that Access Technologies was not providing the employment he expected.6 In violation of the H-1B program requirements, Access Technologies required Panwar to pay for his visa, did not give
him a work assignment or paycheck for eight months, and eventually placed
him in a job with a substantially lower pay rate.7 Panwar wanted to quit his employment and find other work, but he could not because he was unable to pay
$20,000 (the equivalent of almost five years’ salary in his native India).8 When
Panwar complained about the work arrangements, Access Technologies threatened to a fire him.9 As a result, he was left in the position of neither being able
to quit nor to advocate for better conditions. Either action would result in crushing debt, as well as deportation.10 Access Technologies eventually discharged
Panwar, revoked his visa, and sued him to recover the $20,000 in liquidated
damages.11 Panwar brought suit alleging violations of the visa statute and federal anti-trafficking laws.12
Panwar’s situation is not unique. Many contracts signed by visa workers
include a “liquidated damages clause” that requires the worker to pay the employer a large sum of money if they stop working for the employer, either to
switch employers or to return home.13 These clauses may also be triggered if
the party is fired or constructively discharged.14 Because these sums of money
are so large relative to the worker’s ability to pay, they prevent workers from

3

See id. at 952–53.
Id. at 954.
5 Panwar II, 2015 WL 1396599 at, *2.
6 Id.
7 Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. at 954.
8 Id. at 958. Currency Converter, OANDA, https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/ [http
s://perma.cc/9JQX-UZCG] (last visited Jan. 3, 2019); Physiotherapist Salary in India,
NAUKRIHUB, http://www.naukrihub.com/salary-in-india/salary-of-physical-therapist.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/M5BL-BHXE] (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).
9 See Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. at 954.
10 Panwar II, 2015 WL 1396599, at *2.
11 Id.
12 Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. at 957.
13 See Matt Smith et al., Job Brokers Steal Wages and Entrap Indian Tech Workers in US,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/28/-sp-jobs-brok
ers-entrap-indian-tech-workers [https://perma.cc/5393-NEZB].
14 Constructive discharge occurs when an employee is forced to quit because of oppressive
conditions. 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(C) (2019) requires that the Department of Labor
consider the actions of the employer that contributed to the employee ceasing employment.
4

19 NEV. L.J. 413, ONTIVEROS

416

4/8/2019 5:44 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:2

leaving employment or, in many situations, from advocating for better conditions.15
This article examines whether those liquidated damages clauses are enforceable. It suggests that there are two different ways to analyze these clauses:
a contract law approach and a free labor approach. The contract law approach—found in state contract law and the statute that regulates H-1B visas—
serves efficiency purposes by providing for the general enforceability of contracts, while also allowing for the payment of certain compensatory remedies
for breach.16 The visa statute starts with this general orientation but modifies it
to recognize the special circumstances surrounding visa contracts. On the other
hand, the free labor approach—found in a variety of statutes passed pursuant to
the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution—focuses on the
purposes behind the prohibitions of involuntary servitude and of debt peonage.17 Although these two arrangements are related and both fit within the ambit of modern day slavery, there are subtle differences between them that are
worth exploring and making explicit. “Involuntary servitude” focuses on the
harms to an individual and society when an employee is unable to quit work
because the individual is unable to pay a large debt or for other reasons.18
“Debt peonage” focuses on the harms that arise when that inability to quit is
linked to a requirement that the employee work for a specific person in exchange for payment of a debt.19 These harms occur even if the individual voluntarily entered into the arrangement and even if the debt is relatively small.20
This paper argues that liquidated damages clauses in visa contracts must be analyzed under both the contract law and free labor approaches because they
serve different purposes. It also offers suggestions to attorney advocates,
courts, legislatures and academics to ensure that both approaches are considered in these cases.
The first section of this article describes the problem of liquidated damages
clauses in guest worker contracts, including how they arise, their prevalence,
and the role played by the worker’s inability to challenge contract breaches
committed by the employer. The second section of the article explains the two
different approaches used to evaluate the validity of these clauses—the contract
15

In many of the cases reviewed, the employer threatens to discharge the worker for complaining. See infra Sections II.A, II.B.
16 See infra Section II.A.
17 See infra Section II.B.
18 See infra Section II.B.1.b. This article will only explore involuntary servitude tied to the
payment of debt. Other types of arrangements can lead to involuntary servitude. For a discussion of some other types of arrangements leading to involuntary servitude, see Kathleen
Kim, Beyond Coercion, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1558, 1560 (2015).
19 Other forms of peonage may exist, but this article focuses on a peonage relationship
caused by debt. This paper uses the term debt peonage because it best captures the historical
and contemporary language found in statutes and case law, while still focusing on debt
caused by liquidated damages. See infra Section II.B.2.
20 See infra Section II.B.2.
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law approach and the free labor approach. After discussing the contract law approach, this section analyzes these arrangements as potential violations of the
prohibitions against involuntary servitude and debt peonage. By exploring the
definitions and harms of these prohibitions separately, this section advances the
understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment because it unpacks the differences
between involuntary servitude and debt peonage, while also recognizing their
overlaps. The final section of the article returns to the case of Rituraj Singh
Panwar, presenting and critiquing the outcome of the case under both the contract approach and the free labor approach. Building on the critique of Panwar
the paper concludes with strategic recommendations for attorney advocates,
courts, and policy makers.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSES IN GUEST WORKER
CONTRACTS

The United States established the so-called “guest worker” visa program in
order to allow non-citizen migrants to work in the U.S. for a limited period of
time.21 Visas are available for selected occupations, such as skilled, technical
jobs (covered by the H-1B visa), agriculture (H-2A visa) and laborers (H-2B).22
Under the program, once an employer obtains a visa, it can fill the visa position
with a qualified worker.23 The program is structured so that the visa is applied
for, given to, held by, and controlled by the employer.24 Once an employee is
selected to fill a visa opening, he or she becomes eligible to live and work in
the U.S. on that visa.25 If the employee separates from employment with that

21

Some may be renewed for an additional time period, but there are generally cumulative
time limits for any individual worker. At the end of this time period, the worker must either
leave the country or become a naturalized citizen. Temporary (Nonimmigrant) Workers, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-non
immigrant-workers [https://perma.cc/U4D4-GXD8] (last updated Sept. 7, 2011).
22 Id. Other common visa holders include student workers and nannies brought in under the
J-1 visa program. Exchange Visitors, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.
gov/working-united-states/students-and-exchange-visitors/exchange-visitors [https://perma.c
c/WK3M-XFU3] (last updated Nov. 8, 2018). Since participants in this program work
through an exchange program that operates differently than a traditional employment arrangement, they are not addressed in this article.
23 Temporary (Nonimmigrant) Workers, supra note 21. For an example of worker qualifications, see H1-B Specialty Occupations, DOD Cooperative Research and Development Project Workers, and Fashion Models, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.
gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations-dod-cooperative-r
esearch-and-development-project-workers-and-fashion-models [https://perma.cc/CD4H-HU
SM] (last updated Apr. 3, 2017).
24 Maria L. Ontiveros, H-1B Visas, Outsourcing and Body Shops: A Continuum of Exploitation for High Tech Workers, 38 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6–9 (2017).
25 Temporary (Nonimmigrant) Workers, supra note 21.
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employer, either because they quit or are fired, the worker loses legal authorization to be in the country and becomes deportable.26
The employment of guest workers is regulated by both common law and a
variety of statutes. As employees, they are covered by state and federal employment statutes such as wage and hour regulations, anti-discrimination provisions, and labor trafficking protection laws. Guest workers who sign contracts
with their employers—a practice that is particularly common for H-1B workers—are covered by state common law of contracts. In addition, the visa statute
provides specific protection for the workers.27 The validity of liquidated damages clauses in guest worker contracts are typically analyzed under state common law, the visa statute and federal labor trafficking protection laws.28
Cases brought by employers against visa employees to enforce liquidated
damages are typically filed as breach of contract claims in state superior courts.
As a result, they can be difficult to track unless they are appealed to a higher
level. In order to determine the prevalence of liquidated damages clause enforcement in guest worker contracts, the Center for Investigative Reporting
searched court dockets in geographic areas with high tech companies and found
hundreds of cases where companies had sued H-1B workers for leaving before
the end of the contract term.29 Other examples of the problem are found in cases brought by guest workers challenging liquidated damages provisions under
either the visa statute or federal laws.30
The possibility of having to pay $20,000 or another similarly large amount
makes it very difficult for an employee to quit because the average technical
college graduate in India earns between $4,500 and $6,000 per year.31 In many
situations, the workers are already in debt because they had to borrow money to
pay for a visa fee—typically around $3,000.32 The employers and recruiting
companies will often pursue enforcement of these judgments in India against
the employee’s family as well.33 The problem is multiplied because once the
employer sues one worker, the employer can credibly threaten suit against other
workers in order to prevent them from quitting.34
In Panwar’s case and others, the employer appears to be in violation of the
contract and the visa law. Thus, it seems that the employee should be able to
remedy their situation (i.e. be given a placement or be paid at an appropriate
26

Norman Matloff, On the Need for Reform of the H-1B Non-Immigrant Work Visa in
Computer-Related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 815, 868 (2003); Sharmila Rudrappa, Cyber-Coolies and Techno-Braceros: Race and Commodification of Indian Information Technology Guest Workers in the United States, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 368 (2009).
27 See infra Section II.A.2; See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.700–760 (2019).
28 See infra Sections II.A, II.B.
29 Smith et al., supra note 13.
30 See infra Section II.B.1.
31 Smith et al., supra note 13.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 20–21 and cases discussed below.
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rate) by suing for breach of contract or prosecuting the employer under the
statute. However, this is not a viable approach for several reasons.35 First, many
employees are not aware of their rights and may have limited access to the legal
system, either because of lack of resources or because of restrictions placed on
legal services providers in the statute.36 More importantly, they are intimidated
by the employer and fear being discharged and deported if they complain. One
researcher concluded, “[v]isa holders, by the very nature of their situation as
workers dependent upon employers for the right to remain in the country—
either permanently or temporarily—remain less likely to protest against unfair
working conditions than their counterparts with permanent resident status.”37
Finally, bringing a private cause of action is slow, difficult and perceived as ineffective,38 while enforcement by state agencies has not been as effective as anticipated.39
Cases evaluating the enforceability of liquidated damages come to court in
several different ways. If an individual believes the visa statute has been violated, he or she must first file a claim with an administrative agency because there
is no right to bring a private cause of action in federal court.40 An administrative law judge decides the case, which is then reviewed by the U.S. Department
of Labor Administrative Review Board.41 Parties may then appeal to a U.S.
District Court.42 Alternatively, if an employee believes that the liquidated damages clause violates an independent federal statute, such as the free labor statutes discussed below, the employee may challenge the clause directly in federal
court.43 Finally, if an employer sues an employee to recover liquidated damag35

See id. at 11–14.
This is particularly a problem for H-2A agricultural workers and H-2B laborers.
Alejandro V. Cortes, Note, The H-2A Farmworker: The Latest Incarnation of the Judicially
Handicapped and Why the Use of Mediation to Resolve Employment Disputes Will Improve
Their Rights, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 409, 415–21 (2006). See also Alison K. Guernsey,
Double Denial: How Both the DOL and Organized Labor Fail Domestic Agricultural Workers in the Face of H-2A, 93 IOWA L. REV. 277, 291–99 (2007); Michael Holley, Disadvantaged by Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest Workers from Enforcing their
Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 597–616 (2001); Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant
Workers and the Thirteenth Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY 279, 282 (Alexander
Tsesis ed., 2010).
37 Todd H. Goodsell, Note, On the Continued Need for H-1B Reform: A Partial, Statutory
Suggestion to Protect Foreign and U.S. Workers, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 153, 172 (2007).
38 Alaina M. Beach, H-1B Visa Legislation: Legal Deficiencies and the Need for Reform, 6
S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 273, 282 (2010).
39 Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 28 (“The overall lesson from these cases is that although employees and the government are bringing actual, harmful violations [of the visa laws] to
courts, they face a long, slow and often ineffective road.”).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Watson v. Bank of Am., 196 F. App’x 306, 307 (5th Cir. 2006); Venkatraman v. REI
Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 423–24 (4th Cir. 2005); Gupta v. Perez, 101 F. Supp. 3d 437, 460–
61 (D.N.J. 2015).
43 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
36
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es, the employee may argue that it is unenforceable under state law or the visa
law. If the employer prevails and the employee faces a judgment requiring
payment of a claim, the employee can then file a claim with the Department of
Labor alleging a violation of the visa law.44 No matter how these cases reach
the courts, two different approaches have been used to examine their validity:
contract law and free labor.
II. TWO APPROACHES TO EVALUATING THE VALIDITY OF LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES
The validity of liquidated damages clauses are adjudicated under two different approaches: the contract law approach and the free labor approach. The
former is primarily a creature of state law and is meant to serve interests of efficiency in the enforcement of contracts and fair compensation when a contract
is breached. The latter is mainly a federal law concern originating in the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which eliminated slavery and involuntary servitude.45 This section describes the two approaches—explaining
how they have been applied in guest worker liquidated damages cases and analyzing their underlying purposes. Because these approaches serve such different
policies, both must be considered independently in evaluating the validity of
these clauses.
A. The Contract Law Approach
Courts often employ a two-step process when considering liquidated damages clause cases in the guest worker context. As a starting point, courts look to
the state common law of contract which tends to allow liquidated damages
clauses so long as they are compensatory and not punitive.46 Next, in many
cases, they will also evaluate the contract law provision found specifically in
the visa statute, which validates the importance of the state law but also imposes additional restrictions.47
1. State Common Law
Most states allow liquidated damages to be assessed in limited situations.
The amount of the damages must be “reasonable in the light of the anticipated
or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss.”48 Stipulated damages that are too large are unenforceable as a penalty that violates
public policy.49 In determining whether the amount is reasonable, courts look at
44
45
46
47
48
49

Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 32–35.
See infra Section II.B.1.
See infra Section II.A.1.
See infra Section II.A.2.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (AM LAW. INST. 1981).
Id. at cmt. b.
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whether it approximates the amount anticipated to be lost at the time the contract was made or if it approximates the amount actually lost in retrospect.50 In
addition, the party seeking to collect the damages must show that the damages
are difficult to estimate.51
Courts have followed this approach in evaluating liquidated damages
clauses in H-1B contracts. In Tekstrom v. Savla, for example, Sameer Savla
signed an agreement to fill an H-1B position with Tekstrom that included a liquidated damages clause requiring him to pay Tekstrom $18,000 if he left employment early.52 When Savla reported to work, he expected to complete a
three-week training course and then be placed into a job.53 Instead, he was
housed in an overcrowded apartment, forced to sleep on the floor in a sleeping
bag, refused the promised health insurance and not given a position for four
months.54 One of the other participants left the program, and Tekstrom told
Savla that if he tried to leave, “he would make an example of him.”55 After
Savla was finally placed in a short term assignment, he inquired about his visa,
pay stubs, and employment contract.56 Tekstrom threatened Savla with “a civil
lawsuit, criminal charges, possible deportation and the destruction of his career” if he persisted in complaining and asking questions.57 Savla became so
stressed and physically ill over these threats that he left the assignment.58
Tekstrom sued Savla for $18,000, citing the liquidated damages clause in
the contract and arguing that it would cover “the company’s estimate of its investment in a trainee, including housing, training, software licensing fees, marketing efforts and work performed by Tekstrom’s staff as well as potential lost
revenues from the early termination of a prospective work assignment.”59 Savla
argued that the liquidated damages clause was unenforceable and filed counterclaims for tort and contract violations.60 The court found that the liquidated
damages clause was void as a penalty because it violated both requirements for
a valid clause.61 The court said that the company could have easily estimated
the actual costs of housing and training, so the costs were not difficult to estimate.62 In addition, the fee bore no relation to the specified bases for the dam-

50

Id.
Id.
52 Tekstrom, Inc. v. Savla, C.A. No. 05A-12-006 (JTV), 2006 WL 2338050, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 31, 2006).
53 Id. at *1.
54 Id. at *2.
55 Id.
56 Id. at *3.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at *6.
60 Id. at *3.
61 Id. at *6.
62 Id.
51
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ages.63 The court concluded, “Savla would have had to pay the $18,000 in penalty whether he was working for one day or eighteen months. There is nothing
in the record to show how the amount was arrived at or whether it is proportionate to whatever actual damage would result from a contract breach.”64
Therefore, the court refused to make Savla pay Tekstrom the money.65
An evaluation of liquidated damages clauses under contract law recognizes
that the purpose of awarding damages for breach of contract is compensatory,
not punitive.66 Contract law is not concerned with ensuring that a deal is consummated or that a promise is kept.67 A promise can be broken if the breaching
party pays the other party to the contract an appropriate amount of compensation.68 In other words, contract law does not seek to punish someone for breaking a promise or to force someone into completing a deal for its own sake. It
seeks to either enforce the contract OR to make sure that there is adequate
compensation. A clause that is punitive, and therefore unenforceable, is one
that seeks to coerce performance rather than estimate damages. Punitive clauses
are unenforceable because they serve only to punish someone for breaking a
promise, do not serve the purpose of compensation, and have “no justification
on either economic or other grounds.”69 Some contract scholars explain the basis for this approach under the theory of “efficient breach,” which argues that
sometimes it is more efficient or beneficial to the breaching party to breach the
contract and pay the damage.70 Society benefits from this view of contracts because it maximizes the efficiency of the transaction. Liquidated damages clauses which punish parties run afoul of these basic contract policies of efficiency
and compensation because they do not allow for an efficient breach to occur.
2. The Visa Statute
The guest worker visa statute builds upon these basic common law contract
principles when evaluating liquidated damages clauses but adds additional
guidance for judges. Regulations passed pursuant to the statute specify that employers may not penalize employees for ceasing employment prior to an agreed
date, but they do permit the employer to collect “bona fide liquidated damag-

63

Id.
Id.
65 Id.
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981); 24
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 65:1 (4th ed. 2018).
67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356, cmt. a; 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 65:1.
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356, cmt. a; 24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 65:1.
69 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356, cmt. a.
70 Barry E. Adler, Efficient Breach Theory Through the Looking Glass, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1679, 1688 (2008) (describing efficient breach theory as “a cornerstone of the economic
analysis of contract law”).
64
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es.”71 In evaluating whether the required payments are allowable as liquidated
damages, courts are instructed to use applicable state law and look to whether
the damages are “reasonable approximations or estimates of the anticipated or
actual damage caused to one party by the other party’s breach of the contract.”72 In addition, the regulations explain that state law generally requires
“that the relation or circumstances of the parties, and the purpose(s) of the
agreement, are to be taken into account,” and that “a payment would be considered to be a prohibited penalty where it is the result of fraud or where it cloaks
oppression.”73 The regulations also state that “the sum stipulated must take into
account whether the contract breach is total or partial (i.e., the percentage of the
employment contract completed).”74 Finally, the regulations provide that although the Administrator shall apply relevant state law, the application shall include “consideration where appropriate to actions by the employer, if any, contributing to the early cessation, such as the employer’s constructive discharge
of the nonimmigrant or non-compliance with its obligations under the INA and
its regulations.”75
The regulatory history of the regulations passed pursuant to the visa statute
provide insight on the purpose of the language requiring these additional considerations. The Department of Labor sought input on how it should determine
whether a payment required for ceasing employment is a prohibited penalty or
allowable liquidated damages.76 The Department of Labor originally took the
position that the regulations should not specify any particular guidelines and
should instead leave the matter to the discretion of state court judges to only
apply this regulation based on state law.77 The Department opined that state
courts were better able than a federal administrative forum to address “the various legal questions posed by any agreement between an employer and an H-1B
worker, and to conclusively determine whether a particular provision runs afoul
of State law.”78 It also stated that the Department lacked expertise in interpret71

20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(A)–(B) (2019).
20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(C).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. In addition, the liquidated damages may not be used to cover or rebate the
$500/$1,000 filing fee under section 214(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).
Id. Further, any payments for liquidated damages must comply with 20 C.F.R.
§ 655.731(c)(9). Id. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(B). These require, among other things that any deductions must be agreed to voluntarily and in writing by the employee; intended to benefit
the employees, not simply cover the employer’s regular business expenses; not exceed the
stated expenses; and not exceed the federal limits on garnishment of wages. Id.
§ 655.731(c)(9)(iii)(A)–(E).
76 Labor Condition Applications and Requirements for Employers Using Nonimmigrants on
H-1B Visas in Specialty Occupations and as Fashion Models; Labor Certification Process for
Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States, 64 Fed. Reg. 628, 648 (Jan. 5, 1999)
(to be codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 655–56).
77 Id.
78 Id.
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ing state law.79 Commenters strongly objected to this approach, arguing that it
was contrary to the intent of the visa law and “inconsistent with the role intended for the Department”.80 In response, the Department changed its approach. It
stated, “Notwithstanding the Department’s continued reluctance to identify and
interpret State law, the Department now concurs with the view that Congress
intended the Department to determine whether a provision is liquidated damages or a penalty.”81
As a result, the final regulations start with a reiteration of general state contract law, prohibiting penalties for quitting work before the end of the contract
term but allowing liquidated damages that are reasonable estimates of damages.82 It then supplements that statement with three additional guidelines. These
require that the relationships and circumstances of the parties must be taken into account (including the presence of fraud or oppression); that the amount
must be adjusted depending upon how much time has been worked by the employee; and that the validity may turn on whether the employee’s resignation
was actually a constructive discharge caused by the employer’s actions.83 Thus,
the intent of the visa statute is to take a more nuanced look at liquidated damages clauses in guest worker contracts than that found under state common law,
in order to take into account the special power imbalance of this situation. In
addition, it recognizes that an all-or-nothing type of liquidated damages clause
is usually punitive. Finally, it counsels that sometimes a voluntary quit or resignation should be treated as a discharge.
Novinvest provides an example of how courts apply the visa provision.84 In
that case, four visa workers left their work early and their employer sued in a
Georgia state court to recoup the liquidated damages specified in the contract.85
The employer secured a state court judgment requiring the employees to pay a
$5,000 “investment fee” to cover the business expenses necessary to “hire, train
and process” the employees.86 The employees filed an administrative law complaint with the Department of Labor under the relevant visa law.87 The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that the fee violated both the state liquidated
damages law, which is incorporated in the visa statute, and the visa statute pro79

Id.
Labor Conditions Applications and Requirements for Employers Using Nonimmigrants
on H-1B Visas in Specialty Occupations and as Fashion Models; Labor Certification Process
for Permanent Employment of Aliens in the United States, 65 Fed. Reg. 80110, 80173 (Dec.
20, 2000) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 655–66).
81 Id. at 80174.
82 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(C) (2019).
83 Id.
84 ALJ’s Decision and Order at 19, Novinvest, LLC, Docket No. 2002-LCA-00024 (Dep’t
of Labor Jan. 21, 2003), aff’d, ARB’s Final Decision and Order, Novinvest, LLC, Docket
No. 02-LCA-24 (Dep’t of Labor July 30, 2004).
85 Id. at 2, 7.
86 Id. at 7, 18.
87 Id. at 2.
80
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visions.88 The ALJ found that the award failed under state liquidated damages
law because the employer did not specify how it arrived at the amount of
$5,000.89 The employees prevailed under the visa statute, at least in part, because of the nature of the guest worker-employer relationship and the fact that
their treatment violated the standards set forth in the visa law.90 Consequently,
the employer was ordered to return any money it had collected under the state
judgments to the employees.91 Novinvest illustrates how these cases are adjudicated using principles underlying state contract law, with the enhanced protection and nuance required by the visa statute.
B. The Free Labor Approach
The free labor approach to evaluating the validity of liquidated damages
provisions originates in the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, passed in 1789, which states “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude
. . . shall exist within the United States.”92 This Amendment not only abolished
chattel slavery but also prohibited involuntary servitude and set a policy of free
and voluntary labor in the United States.93 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed
two laws aimed at eliminating other systems of unfree labor that continued to
exist after the abolition of chattel slavery. On March 2, 1867, Congress passed
a statute variously referred to as the Anti-Peonage Act and the Peonage Abolition Act.94 Although focused on abolishing the Spanish peonage system established in the territory of New Mexico, its language and legislative history covers and prohibits a broad range of oppressive labor arrangements.95 The statute
read:
88

Id. at 21.
Id. at 22. The Georgia liquidated damages law required a showing that damages are difficult to estimate, that the amount be intended to cover damages and not be a penalty, and that
the amount be a reasonable estimate of the probable loss. Id. at 21–22.
90 The court focused on the requirements under 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(9)(iii). Id. at 19–20.
91 Id. at 22.
92 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. This article only addresses the narrow topic of free labor prohibitions against requiring employees to pay a debt before they may quit work, but the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits a variety of other labor arrangements and governmental action,
as well.
93 Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) (“The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth
Amendment . . . [was] to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States.”); see also James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor
in the Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude”, 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1517 (2010); Lea
S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437,
438, 453, 495 (1989); Rebecca E. Zietlow, A Positive Right to Free Labor, 39 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 859, 861, 877 (2016).
94 Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1994
(2012)); 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012).
95 Aviam Soifer, Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually Forgotten Prohibition
of Voluntary Peonage, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1607, 1617 (2012) (explaining the legislative
history and statute cover voluntary, as well as involuntary, service as a peon and service
compelled by things other than debt).
89
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[T]he holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is hereby declared to be unlawful, and the same is hereby abolished and
forever prohibited . . . any attempt . . . to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly
or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, be, and the same are
hereby, declared null and void; and any person or persons who shall hold, arrest,
or return, or cause to be held, arrested, or returned . . . to a condition of peonage,
shall, upon conviction, be punished [with criminal sanctions].96

In 1874, Congress passed a statute commonly referred to as The Padrone
Statute.97 Aimed at eliminating a system where children were kidnapped in Italy and brought to the United States to work, its language was much broader.98 It
read:
Whoever shall knowingly and willfully bring into the United States . . . any person inveigled or forcibly kidnaped in any other country, with intent to hold such
person . . . to any involuntary servitude; or whoever shall knowingly and willfully sell or cause to be sold, into any condition of involuntarily servitude, any other person for any term whatever; or whoever shall knowingly and willfully hold
to involuntary servitude any person so brought or sold, shall [be subject to criminal penalties].99

In 1948, Congress worked to revise, codify, and enact into positive law Title 18 of the U.S. Code.100 As part of this process, most of the requirements
within these two early statutes—along with other laws addressing slavery—
found their way in a modern form into Chapter 77 titled “Peonage and Slavery”
(covering 18 U.S.C. 1581–1588) (hereinafter “Chapter 77”).101 The antipeonage statute was split in two. The first part of the anti-peonage statute, abolishing and prohibiting voluntary and involuntary peonage, was codified in a
different section of the U.S. Code outside of Chapter 77.102 The second part of
the anti-peonage statute became 18 U.S.C. § 1581.103 It provides that
“[w]hoever holds or returns any person to a condition of peonage” shall be sub96

14 Stat. at 546.
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 945 (1988).
98 Michael H. LeRoy, Compulsory Labor in a National Emergency: Public Service or Involuntary Servitude? The Case of Crippled Ports, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 331, 356
n.115 (2007).
99 18 U.S.C. § 446 (1925). 18 U.S.C. § 446 was derived from An Act to Protect Persons of
Foreign Birth Against Forcible Constraint or Involuntary Servitude, ch. 464, 18 Stat. 251
(1874), which was repealed by Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 341, 35 Stat. 1153, 1154
(1909).
100 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683 (1948).
101 Id. at 772. The group at the time was codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–88. Id.
102 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012) provides:
97

The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished
and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all . . . usages . . . to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor
of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null
and void.
103

62 Stat. at 772.
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ject to criminal sanctions.104 The Padrone Statute’s prohibition against involuntary servitude was later reworked and became 18 U.S.C. § 1584.105 That section
reads, “[w]hoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or
sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person” shall be
subject to criminal sanctions.106 Thus, by the end of the 21st century, one set of
major free labor statutes was included in Chapter 77, with peonage covered in
Section 1581 and involuntary servitude covered in Section 1584.107
Several cases were brought to challenge oppressive working conditions
under Section 1584, with some, such as United States v. Mussry, succeeding in
giving a broad reading to involuntary servitude.108 However, in 1988, in
Kozminski, the Supreme Court gave a very constrained reading to the term “involuntary servitude,” focusing on the need for physical restraint instead of psychological coercion.109 In response to and in order to overrule Kozminski, in
2000, Congress passed the Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act (“TVPA”).110 It
added sections 1589-1594 to Title 18 of the U.S. Code, and Chapter 77 became
“Peonage, Slavery and Trafficking in Persons.”111 The TVPA also increased the
criminal penalties associated with Section 1581 Peonage and Section 1584 In-

104

Id.
Id. at 773.This section is a codification of a combination of the Padrone Statute and the
Slave Trade Statute, as amended in 1909, formerly 18 U.S.C. § 423 (repealed 1948). United
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 945–48 (1988) (discussing codification of acts into
§ 1584).
106 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2012).
107 Other statutes also build on the free labor guarantee of the Thirteenth Amendment. Equal
employment statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, has its origin in the
Anti-Peonage Act, as enforced by the Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department and the
Fair Employment Practices Committee in the 1940’s. RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE
OF CIVIL RIGHTS 11 (2007) (chronicling the work of the Civil Rights Section, including the
connection of its work to the Thirteenth Amendment and its work to amend the Antipeonage Act); Maria L. Ontiveros, The Fundamental Nature of Title VII, 75 OHIO ST. L.J.
1165, 1178–94 (2014) (tracing the evolution of Title VII through the FEPC and Civil Rights
Section). The National Labor Relations Act also incorporates the free labor principle of the
Thirteenth Amendment. James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce
Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 39–41 (2002); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J.
941, 943 (1997). The minimum wage statutes may also be seen as free labor statute connected to the Thirteenth Amendment. See generally Ruben J. Garcia, The Thirteenth Amendment
and Minimum Wage Laws, 19 NEV. L.J. 479 (2018).
108 United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1451–52, 1455 (9th Cir. 1984). But see United
States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964) (limiting definition of involuntary servitude).
109 Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 948. This case did not address any financial restriction on the
workers’ ability to leave employment.
110 The Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act was passed as part (Division A) of the Victims
of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464,
1466–91 (codified as amended 22 U.S.C. §§ 2152d, 7101–12 (2012)). The TVPA, as passed
in 2000, is found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–94 (2012).
111 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–94 (2012).
105
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voluntary Servitude.112 In 2003, Congress amended the TVPA to provide for a
private, civil cause of action for any violation of Chapter 77.113
In the TVPA, Congress repudiated the narrow definition of “involuntary”
and defined involuntary servitude as servitude induced by “any scheme, plan,
or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that, if the person did not enter
into or continue in such condition, that person or another person would suffer
serious harm.”114 It also added section 1589 titled “Forced Labor” which provided criminal remedies for, among other things, obtaining labor through the
use of “threats of serious harm” or by a plan intended to cause a person to believe they would suffer serious harm if they did not perform labor or services.115
In 2008, Congress again amended the TVPA to clarify this definition further and broaden protection. Section 1589 now reads:
(a) Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by
any one of, or by any combination of, the following means-...
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another
person;
...
shall be punished as provided under subsection (d). 116

The 2008 amendment also added a definition of “serious harm” to include
financial harm “that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same
circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to
avoid incurring that harm.”117 In this way, Congress clearly articulated an expansive, inclusive definition of involuntary, and, for the purposes of examining
liquidated damages clauses, one that specifically deals with threats of serious
financial harm.
These two provisions—the Section 1584 prohibition on involuntary servitude and the Section 1581 prohibition on peonage—can be used to analyze
whether liquidated damages provisions violate the principle of free labor. The
current standard being used to determine whether liquidated damage provisions
violate the Section 1584 prohibition against involuntary servitude tracks the
language in Section 1589 on forced labor.118 Although Section 1581 prohibits
peonage, none of the free labor statutes define the term peonage.119 Case law,
112

Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386, 114
Stat. 1464, 1486 (2000) (amending 18 U.S.C. §§1581(a), 1583–1584).
113 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2012).
114 22 U.S.C. § 7102(6)(A) (2012).
115 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(2) (2012).
116 Id.
117 Id. § 1589(c)(2).
118 See supra Section II.B.
119 The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000 does include a definition for debt bondage, but that term is only used in a few sections of the TVPA requiring
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however, defines it as the condition of a person compelled to continue to labor
for another, in payment of a debt, regardless of the size of the debt and regardless of whether the arrangement was entered into voluntarily or involuntarily.120
This section examines each of these prohibitions in more detail, focusing on
how courts have examined whether liquidated damages provisions violate these
prohibitions and explicating the purposes behind the prohibitions.
1. Involuntary Servitude
Federal law prohibits involuntary servitude, including labor that is obtained
by means of serious financial harm or threats of serious financial harm.121 Thus,
when a visa worker is unable to quit because of the serious financial harm he or
she would suffer from having to pay a large fee for liquidated damages, the
worker is laboring in a state of involuntary servitude that violates the TVPA.
This section discusses two cases that reached this conclusion. It then discusses
the harms associated with involuntary servitude to show why it is prohibited.
a. Involuntary Servitude and Liquidated Damages
Several cases have found that liquidated damages provisions violate the
TVPA. For example, in Nunag-Tanedo v. East Baton Rouge Paris School
Board, a group of teachers contracted to work for a school district in Louisiana.122 Before they began work, the employer required them to pay $5,000 for
their visas.123 Subsequently, the employer insisted that the teachers pay an additional $10,000 and the cost of relocation to the United States; otherwise, the
teachers would forfeit the $5,000 and not be allowed to travel to the United
States and begin employment.124 After arriving in the United States, the teachers complained about their living and working situation.125 The employer sued
one teacher for making complaints and threatened the others with discharge,
legal action, and deportation if they continued to complain.126
The court described the situation as follows:
Enticed by promises of lucrative and exciting employment through a work
program, a foreign worker speaks with recruiters about working in the United
studies and reports. It does not appear to be directly tied to or meant to be used to define peonage as used in the TVPA or Chapter 77. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386, 114 Stat. 1464, 1469 (2000) (codified as 22 U.S.C.
§ 7102).
120 Pierce v. United States 146 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 1944); Bernal v. United States, 241 F.
339, 342 (5th Cir. 1917).
121 18 USC § 1589(a)(2)–(c)(2).
122 Nuñag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138–39 (C.D.
Cal. 2011).
123 Id. at 1138.
124 Id. at 1138, 1142.
125 Id. at 1139.
126 Id.
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States. The recruiters explain the terms and costs of the work program, and the
worker gets a large loan and voluntarily uses it to join the program.
After the worker joins the program and begins employment, the worker becomes unhappy. But if the worker quits, awaiting is a trip home with a massive
amount of debt that will be impossible to repay. Working in the program is the
only way to repay the loan. Is this forced labor? Fraud? No. It is a bargained-for
exchange. Despite the worker’s unhappiness, the terms and costs of the program
were known, and the worker voluntarily obtained the loan to join the program.
The worker’s eventual discontent does not transform the valid contract with the
recruiters into something illegal.
But what if after the worker made the payment, the recruiters alter the program terms and costs? The recruiters demand an additional payment of double
what the worker has already paid. They threaten to kick the worker out of the
program if additional payments aren’t made, and they keep the initial payment
even if the worker decides to leave to program. The worker is therefore faced
with a choice of forfeiting the first payment, knowing that repayment of the debt
may be impossible, or paying the additional money the recruiters now demand.
Knowing that working in this program is the only way to repay the initial debt,
the worker pays the additional sum and continues working in the program.
Once the worker begins employment, complaints about the payments and
working conditions are met with continued threats of termination and deportation. Knowing that this job is the only way to repay the debt, the worker remains
silent and continues working. Is this forced labor? Fraud? 127

The court found that the threat to forfeit a $5,000 fee already paid to the
employer if the workers left constituted forced labor through threats of serious
financial harm because forfeiting $5,000 would constitute an amount equal to a
year and a half of salary in their home country.128 The teachers felt that they
had to continue to work for the school district in order to pay the debt.129 They
also felt compelled to accept the living and working conditions, without complaint, because if they were fired, they would be unable to pay back their
debt.130 Thus, the workers were held in involuntary servitude because of the
threat of serious financial harm.
Similarly, in a default action, the court also found a violation of the TVPA.
In Macolor v. Libiran, Mr. Macolor came to the United States and signed a
contract that included a “liquidated damages” clause that required him to pay
$20,000 if he left work before the end of the contract.131 Because the employer
did not have work for the plaintiff, he left their employ and sought other work
in order to pay for food and housing.132 The defendants threatened to bring a
127

Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1144.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Macolor v. Libiran, No. 14-CV-4555 (JMF) (RLE), 2016 WL 1488121, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 25, 2016); Macolor v. Libiran, No. 14-CV-4555 (JMF), 2016 WL 1453039, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2016) (explaining this was a default judgment because the defendant left
the country and did not return for the proceedings).
132 Macolor, 2016 WL 1488121, at *3.
128
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lawsuit against the plaintiff and retained a collection agency.133 The collection
agency sent letters to Macolor and called him at home, demanding payment of
$27,729.67 ($20,000 in principal, $6,666.66 in collection fees, and $1,063.01 in
interest).134 The Court found a violation of the TVPA because “Defendants’
threats to make Macolor pay them $20,000 if he sought other employment constituted a serious threat of financial harm that would coerce a reasonable person
in Macolor’s circumstances to continue providing labor to Defendants to avoid
the harm.”135 In both of these cases, the court easily found that the liquidated
damages clause violated Section 1584.
b. The Harms of Involuntary Servitude
By its terms, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits both slavery and involuntary servitude.136 A trilogy of early cases brought under the Anti-Peonage
Act described two major purposes behind the prohibition of involuntary servitude.137 The first two cases, Bailey v. Alabama and US v. Reynolds, struck
down convict labor statutes where Blacks were forced to work in order to pay
off debts related to criminal fines and court costs.138 These cases explained that
compelled labor violates the Thirteenth Amendment because a person’s labor is
special and distinct and protected by the anti-slavery mandate.139 Bailey stated
that the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment is to ensure free labor because
“[t]here is no more important concern than to safeguard the freedom of labor
upon which alone can enduring prosperity be based.”140 The court in Bailey explained, “The act of Congress, nullifying all state laws by which it should be
attempted to enforce the ‘service or labor . . . in liquidation of any debt or obligation . . . ’ necessarily embraces all legislation which seeks to compel the service or labor by making it a crime to refuse or fail to perform [labor].”141
The second reason involuntary servitude is prohibited is because the inability to exit employment results in worse conditions for participants in the free
labor market. In Pollock v. Williams, the Supreme Court explained how a system of compelled labor, in order to pay a debt, destroyed the floor for free labor.142 It explained:
133

Id.
Id.
135 Id. at *4.
136 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
137 Although these cases were brought under the Anti-Peonage Statute, these cases are discussed in this section because the Court’s reasoning in the cases focus more on the prohibition of involuntary servitude, in general, rather than on the harms of associated with debt
peonage.
138 United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,
237–39 (1911).
139 Reynolds, 235 U.S. at 150; Bailey, 219 U.S. at 239.
140 Bailey, 219 U.S. at 245.
141 Id. at 243.
142 Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944).
134
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The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment . . . was . . . to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States. . . . [I]n
general, the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or treatment is the right to change employers. When the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress
and no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work. Resulting depression of working conditions and living standards
affects not only the laborer under the system, but every other with whom his labor comes in competition.143

Professor James Gray Pope describes the “Pollock Principle” as one which
focuses on preventing domination and exploitation by allowing workers to quit
in order to encourage them to provide better conditions.144
These twin evils—harsh infringements on the sanctity of human labor and
the destruction of the floor for free labor—can be seen in the treatment of visa
workers in the United States. H-2 agricultural workers and laborers face problems such as low pay, wage theft, poor conditions, and racially motivated harassment and abuse.145 In addition, their access to the legal system is severely
restrained.146 These workers are unable to complain and improve their situation.
Even highly-skilled H-1B technical workers endure poor workplace conditions, spanning a continuum of exploitation depending upon the worker's situation. These workers are routinely made to work long hours for wages below
those paid to non-visa workers and below those prescribed by law.147 A group
of 800 of these workers, tagged the “Siebel Slaves” by the media, were given
an impossible amount of work to do in a short period of time, which resulted in
“overwork, sleep deprivation, and health problems, including miscarriages.”148
Other workers are brought to the United States and made to wait, in violation of
the visa statute, without a job and without pay, for months on end.149 During
this time, they may be housed in an overcrowded apartment, charged excessive
rent, and be prohibited from leaving the neighborhood of the apartment.150
Once employed, the visa holder may engage in wage theft—taking both a percentage of the employee’s wages and taking money—to pay for the cost of
housing and to recoup money lent to the employees when they were not working.151 The workers are unable to complain about these conditions because of
143

Id. at 17–18.
Pope, supra note 93, at 1503.
145 See Etan Newman, No Way to Treat a Guest: Why the H-2A Agricultural Visa Program
Fails U.S. and Foreign Workers, FARMWORKER JUST., 7, 23, https://www.farmworkerjustice.
org/sites/default/files/documents/7.2.a.6%20fwj.pdf [https://perma.cc/32BE-2PH3] (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
146 Id. at 25.
147 Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 11.
148 Id. at 10. The group brought a class action lawsuit which they settled for 27.5 million
dollars. Id.
149 Id. at 19–23.
150 Id. at 22.
151 Id.
144
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the threat of serious financial harm. In addition, this situation has made it easier
for high-tech companies to exploit non-visa workers, using the threat of replacement to reduce wages and quiet complaints.152 These are exactly the
harms discussed in the involuntary servitude cases.
2. Debt Peonage
Currently, there are no reported liquidated damages guest worker visa cases where the worker alleged that the liquidated damages clause violated 14
USC § 1994 prohibiting peonage (hereinafter “Section 1994”); 18 USC § 1581
providing criminal penalties for peonage (hereinafter “Section 1581”); or 18
USC § 1594 providing for a private cause of action under 1581 (hereinafter
“Section 1594”). However, cases arising under these statutes, as well as Section
1584 on involuntary servitude, do examine the types of arrangements that are
prohibited as debt peonage in other factual situations. This section discusses
those cases, how Sections 1994, 1581 and 1595 would fit the case of liquidated
damages clauses in guest worker contracts, and the unique harms associated
with debt peonage.
a. Debt Peonage and Liquidated Damages
In the modern era, most peonage cases have been brought as criminal cases
under Section 1581.153 A typical Section 1581 case involves an employee or
group of employees incurring a debt to come to the United States to work for a
particular employer.154 Once in the U.S. the employer uses threats of physical
force, arrest, and deportation, as well as psychological coercion, to compel a
person to continue to work and pay off a debt owed to the employer. 155 In analyzing these cases, courts start with the recognition that compulsory service in
payment of a debt is a form of involuntary servitude.156 These cases emphasize
that peonage includes voluntary arrangements, even if they are not covered by a
prohibition against involuntary servitude. United States v. Kyongja Kang explained the distinction between peonage and involuntary servitude by defining
peonage as:
[A] status or condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of
the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness. . . . Peonage is sometimes
classified as voluntary or involuntary; but this implies simply a difference in the
mode or origin, but none in the character of the servitude. . . . But peonage,
152

Id. at 24.
18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012); Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867); Mohamed Y. Mattar, Interpreting Judicial Interpretations of the Criminal Statutes of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Ten Years Later, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1247,
1273–75 (2011).
154 See Mattar, supra note 153, at 1273–74.
155 Id. at 1273–74.
156 United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 372 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Booker, 655
F.2d 562, 565 (4th Cir. 1981).
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however created, is compulsory service,—involuntary servitude. . . . That which
is contemplated by the statute is compulsory service to secure the payment of a
debt.157

These cases emphasize that the prohibited relationship is one where the
employee is compelled to labor under the control of the employer by virtue of
debt, no matter how small the debt or whether the employee voluntarily entered
into the relationship.
Another line of cases that examines the concept of involuntary servitude, in
the context of debt peonage, are cases dealing with the requirement that certain
individuals work in order to avoid incarceration—either to pay off debts to the
court, as a condition of probation or parole, or to make legally mandated child
support payments.158 These cases provide a very narrow view of debt peonage,
focusing on the requirement that the debt be tied to a particular employer rather
than debt in general. In this regard, Moss v. Superior Court provides one of the
most extensive discussions of involuntary servitude in the context of debt peonage.159 The court considered whether the requirement that a father work in
order to pay child support or go to jail constituted involuntary servitude/peonage.160 The court focused on the historical roots of the free labor statutes meant to attack systems such as apprenticeships, plantation serfs and Spanish peonage, which involved involuntary servitude in payment of a debt and a
close relationship between the employer and employee.161 It also focused on
those cases where the state has the power to “return the servant to the master
. . . or indirectly by subjecting persons who left the employer’s service to criminal penalties . . . .”162 Based on these and other cases dealing with involuntary
servitude, the court concluded:
When, as here, however, the person claiming involuntary servitude is simply
expected to seek and accept employment, if available, and is free to choose the
type of employment and the employer, and is also free to resign that employment if the conditions are unsatisfactory or to accept other employment, none of

157

United States v. Kyongja Kang, No. 04 CR 87(ILG), 2006 WL 208882, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 25, 2006); see also Dolla v. UniCast Co., 930 F. Supp. 202, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“Peonage is a ‘condition of compulsory service, based upon indebtedness of the peon to the
master.’ . . . [T]he critical elements of a peonage claim are indebtedness and compulsion.”)
(citation omitted).
158 Noah D. Zatz, A New Peonage?: Pay, Work, or Go to Jail in Contemporary Child Support Enforcement and Beyond, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 927, 948–49 (2016) (examining the
requirement that child support payment orders can be enforced through arrest and imprisonment).
159 Moss v. Superior Court, 950 P.2d 59, 66–73 (Cal. 1998).
160 Id. at 61, 74.
161 Id. at 70–71 (arguing that the purpose of the statute was to invalidate “the involuntary or
involuntary service of labor of any persons as peons in liquidation of any debt or obligation”) (citing 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL
RIGHTS, 171 (1970) and Sydney Brodie, The Federally Secured Right to be Free from Bondage, 40 GEO. L.J. 367, 376–77 (1952)).
162 Id. at 71.
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the aspects of “involuntary servitude” which invoke the need to apply a contextual approach to Thirteenth Amendment analysis are present. There is no “servitude” since the worker is not bound to any particular employer and has no restrictions on his freedom other than the need to comply with a lawful order to
support a child.163

Although the Moss decision is somewhat obfuscating because it blends together issues of peonage and involuntary servitude, it does provide one way to
distinguish debt peonage from other types of involuntary servitude. It presents
the argument for a very restrictive definition of debt peonage—the obligation to
work for a particular person in order to pay off a debt.
Liquidated damages clauses in guest worker visa contracts fall within even
this narrow definition of debt peonage. Since a visa is granted for a specific job
for a specific company, the immigrant must work exclusively for that employer
and may not change jobs or even accept outside work because any other employer would not have a visa allowing the immigrant to work in the United
States. When the visa holder is a subcontracting company or labor agency, the
agency determines when, where, and for whom the immigrant works.164 These
agencies also control the amount of money earned by the immigrant, as well as
whether a company may reassign or sublease the employee.165 When the visa
contract includes a large liquidated damages clause, the employee is compelled
to continue to work for that particular employer in order to avoid having to pay
a large debt. As such, contracts with liquidated damages clauses constitute prohibited debt peonage and violates the statute.
b. The Harms of Debt Peonage
Under the most restrictive definition of debt peonage found in cases like
Moss, the harm of debt peonage is that a worker is tied to one particular person.166 In this context, the harm is because the labor of the employee is essentially owned by a particular person until the debt is extinguished. The notion
that one person has exclusive ownership of someone else’s labor runs afoul of
the ideal of free labor. Both the Spanish peonage system and the Padrone system, which were addressed in the early statutes, had this characteristic.167
This characteristic was also integral to the system of antebellum chattel
slavery. A slave’s owner had exclusive ownership of the slave’s labor, even beyond the work directly performed for the owner. Slave codes, the laws that regulated slavery in the American South, gave slave owners the right to control the
labor of their slaves because, in addition to owning the slave, they also owned
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Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 26.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Other 19th century systems with similar exclusive ownership include apprenticeships and
plantation serf systems.
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the labor of the slave.168 For example, the slave owner could assign a slave to
work for someone else and collect payment in exchange for their labor. In addition, the codes gave slave owners the right to control, forbid, or profit from any
independent entrepreneurial work done by slaves.169 Some slaves tended a garden and sold the food at a local market, while others might have worked as a
blacksmith on Sundays or mended and sewed clothes for others, at night, in exchange for money. The slave owner could dictate whether this work could be
done, where it could be done, and could demand a percentage of the money
earned. The slave owner, then, owned and controlled not only the slave but also
the labor of the slave and dictated every aspect of when, where, and how they
could work, as well as for how much money.
The guest worker visa system operates in a similar way because the employer that holds the visa controls—essentially owns—the labor of the guest
worker hired to fill the visa. It exclusively controls when, where, for whom, and
for how much the immigrant can work. If the immigrant refuses that work, he
or she must leave the country. In this way, the employee does not control his or
her own labor—it is owned by the visa holder in a manner that parallels slave
ownership.170
In the United States, this arrangement is unique to the visa system. Although an employer may direct its workforce and tell an employee where and
when to work, there are significant differences for visa workers. A non-visa
employee is always free to quit without having to pay a large liquidated damages fee and without having to leave the country. More importantly, free nonvisa employees are allowed to take additional jobs without interference from
their employer. There may be some limits on outside work if there is a valid
noncompetition clause, but these are limited to situations where an employee
working for a competitor could damage the employer.171 Perhaps the closest
situation are temporary agencies that assign workers to different job sites and
employers for short term assignments. In that situation, the temporary agency
controls when, where, and for whom the employee works, as well as the wage.
However, the employee is always free to decline an assignment and, most significantly, can look for and accept work with other employers at the same time.
Neither an employer nor a temporary agency owns or controls the labor of the
employee outside of the immediate work relationship.
The key distinction, then, is whether and to what extent the employee has
access to enter the labor market and participate freely in it. Visa workers do not
168

For a thorough discussion of slave codes, see KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR
INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (Vintage Books ed. 1989); see also Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 25–26, 28, 86.
169 Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Customs of Slavery: The War Without Arms, 48 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 177, 180 (2006).
170 Ontiveros, supra note 24, at 26.
171 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (describing when a
restraint on trade is unconscionable).
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have access because the visa holder owns and controls their labor. Other workers in the United States, however, have full access to the labor market without
the control of any other employer. Even the narrow definition of debt peonage
applies to visa workers because the employee is bound to work for a single employer.
Although liquidated damages clauses for guest workers can succeed under
this narrow definition, limiting the definition of debt peonage to debt owed a
particular employer, is too constrained for several reasons. First, it is so narrow
that it is inconsistent with the language of the statute originally prohibiting peonage. Section 1994 prohibits peonage “in liquidation of any debt or obligation,
or otherwise”.172 After examining the legislative history of the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867, Dean Aviam Soifer explains the breadth of the Act.173 By its
terms, the Act “did not restrict the definition of the peonage; it forbade compelled labor due to ‘debt.’ Yet the 1867 Act also recognized that the treatment
it sought to prohibit, whether involuntary or voluntary, could be compelled in
many different ways.”174 He argues that this expansion of the definition of peonage, beyond the traditional definition anchored in debt, was necessary because of the varying contexts in which employers and society in the reconstruction South might enforce a system of peonage. These included contracts for
indentured servitude and the custom and usage of private violence sponsored
by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan.175 Prohibiting voluntary as well as involuntary peonage was necessary to overcome arguments in favor of freedom of
contract that might be used to challenge these systems.176 Based on further
analysis of the legislative history, Soifer argues that the purpose of the Peonage
Prohibition Act is intentionally broad to protect the most vulnerable populations, and urges advocates to explore using Section 1994 in private causes of
action.177 This understanding of the free labor statutes addressing peonage call
for a broad definition of peonage—limiting it to debt-based requirements tied
to one employer does not match the legislative history or purpose of the statutes.
In addition, Professor Noah Zatz criticizes this narrow definition of debt
peonage because the difference between requiring work for one employer versus requiring work in general is illusory.178 He argues:
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42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012) (emphasis added).
Soifer, supra note 95, at 1617.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1617–18. He also argues that the broad reading is consistent with the expanded
powers of the reconstruction congress. See id. at 1637–38.
176 Id. at 1632.
177 Aviam Soifer, Old Lines in New Battles: An Overlooked Yet Useful Statute to Confront
Exploitation of Undocumented Workers by Employers and by ICE, 19 NEV. L.J. 397, 398–99
(2018).
178 Zatz, supra note 158, at 950.
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If an obligation to Person A can be satisfied only by working, and failure to
work triggers prosecution and imprisonment, the Thirteenth Amendment problems are scarcely affected by whether the work is for Person A or some other
Person B. The core difficulty would remain: the worker would be bound to Person B by the carceral threat, eliminating the leverage that comes with the right to
quit and subjecting him to the risk of “a harsh overlordship.”179

In addition, he argues that the ability to work for a variety of employers is
insufficient when the alternative is to go to jail.180 In his opinion, mere freedom
to circulate in the labor market is not the same as free labor, so long as incarceration is the alternative.181 The harm to a system of free labor, in his view,
arises when a person is unable to withdraw from the labor market, under threat
of incarceration.182 Finally, he explains that free labor requires an unfettered
right to quit employment; however, all the employee has in the narrow definition of debt peonage is an unfettered right to switch employers.183 In this situation, an employee may only quit IF he or she has secured another job already.184 He concludes “criminalizing unemployment among debtors cannot
easily be distinguished from criminalizing debtors’ labor mobility between employers—the latter being the evil attacked directly in the peonage cases.”185
Since the same harms associated with involuntary servitude would exist in peonage cases that do not require work for a specific employer, the definition
should be broader.
III. THE PANWAR CASE REVISITED
This section returns to the Panwar case discussed briefly at the outset of
the article, and presents and critiques the outcome.186 Panwar is used as a paradigm example because its two opinions embody the contract and free labor approaches to evaluating liquidated damages. These opinions also reveal important implications and recommendations for advocates, courts, and Congress.
A. Panwar
RS Panwar attended graduate school in the United States and took a
placement with Access Technology as an H-1B worker.187 Before starting
179

Id. (making arguments based upon involuntary servitude cases discussed supra and quoting Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944)).
180 Id. at 951.
181 Id. (distinguishing this from the typical situation faced by all workers where they must
work or be unable to provide for their material subsistence).
182 Id. at 952.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 See Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. 2d 948 (S.D. Ind. 2013); Panwar II, No. 1:12-CV-00619TWP-TAB, 2015 WL 1396599 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2015).
187 Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 953–54.
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work, Access Technology required him to execute a promissory note promising
to pay $20,000 if he left before the end of the contract term.188 When the employer did not provide the type of job or compensation promised, Panwar complained and tried to get information about his future.189 Access Therapies
threatened to terminate his employment if he did not stop trying to improve his
circumstances.190 Panwar wanted to quit, but he could not leave employment
because of the threat of having to pay the $20,000—especially since the employer had a practice of filing lawsuits against former employees who terminated their contracts early.191
1. Outcome
After being terminated, Panwar sued Access Technology for a variety of
causes of action, including a violation of Section 1589 of the TVPA.192 In
Panwar I, the U.S. district court in Indiana considered a motion to dismiss.193 It
found that Panwar stated a claim for a violation of the TVPA because the threat
of being in debt from having to pay $20,000 constituted a threat of serious financial harm that prevented Panwar from voluntarily terminating his employment.194
Two years later, in Panwar II, the same district court ruled on the merits of
the case, and found in favor of the defendant on the TVPA claim.195 According
to the court, the TVPA claim failed for several reasons.196 First, it found that
there was not a “forced labor scheme.”197 It stated that because plaintiffs “voluntarily entered into the employment contracts,” it could not be a forced labor
scheme.198 Similarly, it stated that plaintiffs were not coerced or deceived into
signing the agreements.199 The court emphasized that “There was nothing that
compelled Mr. Panwar . . . to sign the agreements with RN Staff and Access
Therapies, or even enter into the H-1B visa program, besides [his] own

188

Id. at 957.
Id. at 954.
190 Id.
191 Panwar II, 2015 WL 1396599, at *3.
192 Panwar I, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
193 See id. at 958.
194 Id.
195 Panwar II, 2015 WL 1396599, at *5.
196 Id. at *3–4.
197 Id. at *3.
198 Id. (“While Plaintiffs continually refer to their employment with Access Therapies and
RN Staff as a ‘forced labor scheme,’ the fact that they voluntarily entered into the employment contracts belies this characterization.”).
199 Id. (“The contract terms were plainly written, and the liquidated damages provision was
made conspicuous, particularly with the use of the corresponding promissory note. Both Mr.
Panwar and Mr. Agustin understood the agreements and their obligations under the agreements, including the consequences of early termination.”).
189

19 NEV. L.J. 413, ONTIVEROS

440

4/8/2019 5:44 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:2

choice.”200 In evaluating the forced labor claim, the court focused on the initial
decision to enter into the contract, rather than the subsequent points in time
when Panwar wanted to complain about potentially illegal conduct of the employer and wanted to quit but could not because of the financial threat.201 In
addition, the court used its own definition of voluntariness and force to analyze
this claim, rather than referring to specific language of the TVPA.202
Second, the court said that the TVPA claim failed because the liquidated
damages would be allowable under state law and the visa statute.203 It explained that while the visa statute prohibits employers from penalizing employees for ceasing employment, it allows for bona fide liquidated damages and the
validity of liquidated damage clauses must be based on Indiana law.204 According to the court, “Under Indiana law, ‘[w]here the sum stipulated in the agreement is not greatly disproportionate to the loss likely to occur, the provision
will be accepted as a liquidated damages clause and not as a penalty.’ ”205 The
court found that Panwar did not present evidence that the amount of liquidated
damages was grossly disproportionate to the losses incurred by the employer
and credited evidence by the employer that it “must expend thousands of dollars to bring H-1B employees into the United States, including visa filing fees,
lawyer fees, administrative costs, and local agency fees. Additionally, Access
Therapies and RN Staff would lose out on potential profits earned from placing
employees with paying clients.”206 As a result, it found the liquidated damages
provisions valid under both the H-1B regulations and state law.207 It then concluded, “The Court will not penalize Defendants under the TVPA for practices
which they are explicitly permitted to utilize under the relevant laws.”208 The
court essentially performed a contract law analysis on the validity of the liquidated damages provision. It then concluded that any liquidated damages provision that is permitted by contract law could not violate the TVPA.209
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Id.
See id. at *4–5.
202 Id. at *3.
203 Id. at *4.
204 Id. (“The claim that the liquidated damages provision and the promissory note constituted a threat of financial harm sufficient for a finding of liability under the TVPA is not supported by the evidence or the applicable legal principles. An H-1B employer is not permitted
to require an employee to pay a ‘penalty’ for ceasing employment. See 20 C.F.R.
655.731(c)(10)(i)(A). However, ‘[t]he employer is permitted to receive bona fide liquidated
damages from the H-1B nonimmigrant who ceases employment with the employer prior to
the agreed date.’ ”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(10)(i)(B)).
205 Id. at *4 (quoting Gershin v. Demming, 685 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).
206 Id.
207 See id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
201

19 NEV. L.J. 413, ONTIVEROS

Winter 2018]

4/8/2019 5:44 PM

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

441

2. Critique of Outcome
A critique of Panwar highlights the different policies served by the contract and free labor approaches and the problem that results when judges do not
understand these differences or analyze the claims separately. The decision is
problematic under both the contract and free labor approaches. The decision
grounds its analysis in the contract law perspective. From this perspective, the
court focuses on the evidence presented by the employer that the liquidated
damages clause reasonably approximates the thousands of dollars that an employer could expend in bringing an H-1B worker to the United States and profits lost from potential clients. Although this satisfies one requirement of a valid
liquidated damages clause, this argument potentially fails under state law because there is no showing that these costs would be difficult to quantify. Most
states require a showing of both of these.210 If the amount can be easily quantified, there is no need for a liquidated damages clause and the clause can look
more like a punitive clause than a compensatory one.
Even if the court is correct in applying state contract law, the decision is
still faulty under the contract law approach because it fails to correctly analyze
the contract law approach language found in the visa regulations. First, the
court did not take into account the coercive nature of the relationship that developed between the parties after the initial agreement. The statute specifically
requires this analysis, both in determining whether the agreement is valid and
whether the employer’s actions contributed to the early cessation of the employment.211 By focusing only on the relationship at the outset of contract, the
court fails to apply the regulations. In addition, the court does not recognize the
all-or-nothing nature of the liquidated damages clause. Since Panwar would be
required to pay the entire $20,000 regardless of how long he worked for the defendant, it runs afoul of the visa statute requirement that a proper liquidated
damages clause should take into account whether the breach is total or partial.
Without a variable liquidated damages clause, the penalty for leaving no longer
tracks the actual harm caused to the employer by the breach because some percentage of the sunk costs have already been recovered. In addition, when the
time period is shortened, the employer faces fewer potential lost profits earned
from placing employees with paying clients. Thus, the two reasons given by the
employer as the basis for the compensatory damages decline when the employee works for a longer period of time. As a result, the clause appears to be more
of a penalty for stopping work near the end of the contract term instead of a
valid compensatory clause. This court’s failure to correctly apply the visa statute is particularly important because the court grounds its denial of the TVPA
claim on its assertion that it would be allowable under the visa statute.
More importantly, the court did not correctly analyze the case under the
free labor concerns articulated in the TVPA’s prohibition on involuntary servi210
211

See supra Section II.A.1.
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tude. The court ignored the definition of forced labor found in the statute and
focused instead on general ideas of voluntariness, force and coercion. Unlike
Nunag-Tanedo and Macalor, the Panwar court inexplicably never mentions the
language of the TVPA that defines forced labor as labor obtained through the
threat of serious financial harm. In amending the TVPA to overturn Kozminski
and then add additional clarification, Congress has explicitly defined and redefined forced labor and involuntary servitude to provide precise and specific definitions, rejecting general, restrictive definitions of what constitutes involuntary
labor. These precise and specific definitions of involuntariness and force were
ignored by the Panwar court.
Since it ignored this language, the court also failed to discuss the contextual nature of the definition of severe financial harm.212 The TVPA states that the
coercive nature of the amount must be judged using the standard of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s situation and whether it would compel them to keep
working.213 This is a critical requirement because even if the amount charged in
liquidated damage is reasonably related to the loss, it may still be so large that
it prevents a worker from being able to voluntarily end his employment. In this
way, it violates the TVPA. Clearly, a liquidated damages provision may not be
large relative to the damages incurred by an employer but still be large enough
to constitute a serious threat of financial harm to an employee. Such a sum
would violate the TVPA because there is no exception made in the forced labor
statute for reasonable liquidated damages. The prohibition is clear and must be
made independently of any contract law determination.
The inability to analyze the claims separately is at the heart of the problem
with Panwar II. The court explicitly conflated the contract law and free labor
approaches when it said “The Court will not penalize Defendants under the
TVPA for practices which they are explicitly permitted to utilize under the relevant laws.”214 This statement illustrates the twin problems with the decision.
As discussed above, the practices were not allowable under the visa law. More
importantly, the TVPA serves different policies and must be analyzed separately. Neither state contract law nor the visa law preempt the free labor mandate
found in the TVPA.
B. Implications and Strategic Recommendations
This examination of the Panwar case generates implications and recommendations for action to be taken in the courtroom and in Congress. Advocates
need to start bringing a wider variety of claims in these cases, and judges must
212

The contextual nature of coercion is found both in the statute and in the case law developing under the TVPA. See generally Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers,
96 IOWA L. REV. 409, 416 (2011) (analyzing the development of the “situational coercion”
approach to coercion under the TVPA).
213 Id. at 451.
214 Panwar v. Access Therapies, Inc., No. 1:12–CV–00619–TWP–TAB, 2015 WL 1396599,
at *4 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2015).
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recognize the independent nature of the claims. In addition, Congress should
amend Chapter 77 to include a definition for peonage. These actions can lead to
better protection of workers.
1. Courtroom Recommendations for Advocates and Judges
Advocates challenging liquidated damage clauses in guest worker contracts
should bring a wide variety of claims, depending upon the specific facts of the
case. Advocates should continue to file involuntary servitude/forced labor
claims under Section 1584. In these cases, the definition of forced labor as
found in the TVPA must be utilized by judges when deciding the claims. When
a person in similar circumstances to the plaintiff would find the sum of money
owed to the employer is so large that they are unable to quit, the clause violates
the prohibitions on involuntary servitude and forced labor. This is true, even if
the amount required is a reasonable approximation of costs incurred by the employer when the employee quits or otherwise seems reasonable.
Advocates should also begin to bring claims alleging debt peonage under
Section 1582. These claims should be made any time an employee must either
continue to work for a specific employer or incur a significant debt. Advocates
should argue that these arrangements constitute peonage, even if the arrangement was entered into voluntarily and even if the amount is fairly small. If
Panwar had brought a claim, the analysis would have shown that, even though
he voluntarily entered into the agreement, he was forced to continue to work for
Access Technologies in order to extinguish his debt. He did not have the freedom to work for any other employer as a way to pay the debt because his only
work authorization was with Access Technologies. Thus, his labor was compelled by debt to a specific employer in violation of Section 1582.
Finally, advocates should bring claims for violations of the visa statute arguing that the liquidated damages clauses violate the visa statute when there is
evidence of fraud or coercion; where the clause is not variable so it does not
take into account whether the breach is total or partial; and where a quit is actually a discharge caused by the employer’s illegal actions. Employees who are
sued for enforcement of liquidated damages provisions must be ready to argue
that the liquidated damages clauses are unenforceable under state contract law.
The best arguments are likely to be that the employer has not explained the
compensatory bases for the costs or that the costs are not difficult to quantify.
When confronted with both free labor claims and contract law claims,
judges must recognize that these are independent claims and the policies behind
these two types of claims are vastly different from each other. As a result, they
should consider each claim independently and not suggest that compliance with
one set of laws means that the defendant cannot be found liable under the other
set of laws. The policies behind contract law focus on efficiency and compensation. In this way, liquidated damages that are really coercive penalties used to
prevent workers from quitting employment do not serve those policies. The
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policies behind the free labor approach focus on the moral harm to individuals
and society when people are forced to give their human labor, their human essence, without the ability to terminate the labor arrangement.215 In any system
of involuntary servitude, whether caused by a financial threat or otherwise,
there is also a harm to individual employees who suffer from poor work conditions and are unable to escape those conditions by quitting. Other workers also
suffer because they are forced to compete against workers with no bargaining
power, so the floor for free labor is destroyed. Finally, there is a moral harm
when one particular employer essentially owns the labor of a particular person
who is unable break that bondage and work for someone else. Liquidated damages clauses in visa contracts can violate these principles in a myriad of ways.
Courts must understand the two different policies being served and must not
conflate these two claims because they serve such distinct policies.
2. Congressional Recommendation for Amendment of Chapter 77
The free labor statutes dealing with peonage should be amended and clarified. Currently, no definition of peonage is found in Section 1581 or any other
part of Chapter 77.216
Section 1994 abolishes and prohibits peonage, which it says includes “voluntary or involuntary service” of labor as a peon in liquidation of debt or otherwise.217 Case law from Section 1581 focuses on prohibiting the continued
compelled labor of another person, in payment of a debt, regardless of the size
of debt and regardless of whether the arrangement was entered into voluntarily
or involuntarily.218 Other cases focus on the prohibition of compelled labor
when the debt is owed to one particular employer.219
Chapter 77 should be amended to include a broad definition of peonage
that addresses all these situations. A good starting point for discussion of this
definition would be:
1. The following arrangements are per se violations of the prohibition against
peonage: any arrangement, whether entered into voluntarily or involuntarily,
whereby an individual must work for one specific employer or remain in debt to
that employer is prohibited.
2. In addition, arrangements, whether entered into voluntarily or involuntarily,
that compel the service of labor in liquidation of debt, may violate the prohibition against peonage, even if the amount is relatively small.
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See supra Section II.B.
See supra notes 101–07, 119 and accompanying text. As mentioned previously, the
TVPA included a definition of debt bondage; however, that term is not found in the free labor provisions of Chapter 77. It is utilized in other parts of the TVPA that require monitoring
and reporting of certain activities.
217 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012).
218 See Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 87–88 (5th Cir. 1944). See also supra Section
II.B.2.
219 See supra Section II.B.2.a.
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3. Nothing in this definition shall be used to limit claims made that fit
within the definition of peonage found in Section 1994.
In this definition, part one makes it clear that arrangements that violate the
most narrow definition of debt peonage, are explicitly prohibited. Most liquidated damages clauses found in guest worker contracts would fall under this
prohibition. In addition, part two incorporates the broad language from existing
case law and statutes. Finally, the third part preserves the ability of advocates to
creatively reach new situations that might fit under the purpose and language of
the Anti-Peonage Act.
CONCLUSION
Non-immigrant workers who come to the United States to work on temporary guest worker visas may find themselves in a situation of involuntary servitude or debt peonage. The use of liquidated damages clauses in their employment contracts creates this situation when the employee cannot quit because of
the threat of serious financial harm or when they find themselves compelled to
work for a single employer in order to pay off the debt. Either of these situations violate the free labor principle established in the Thirteenth Amendment
and statutes passed pursuant thereto. Unfortunately, some courts only review
these clauses under a contract law model and fail to free the workers from servitude or peonage. Although a legislative amendment to clarify the definition of
peonage would be helpful, advocates can still successfully attack these arrangements using the existing statutes so long as judges understand and validate the important policies found in the free labor statutes.
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